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CPLR 5222, 5230, 5232: Public officials held liable for acting in
conformity with a statute subsequently declared to be unconstitutional
Article 52 of the CPLR governs the enforcement of money
judgments against judgment debtors.45 Among the provisions in
the Article are CPLR 5222, 5230, and 5232, which, respectively, enable the post-judgment creditor to restrain, execute, and levy upon
the property of the judgment debtor.4 6 In 1982, a federal district
45 N.Y. CPLR 5201-5252 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1983-1984).
46 Id. 5222, 5232 (1978 & Supp. 1983-1984); id. 5230 (1978). CPLR 5222(a) provides in

pertinent partA restraining notice may be issued by the clerk of the court or the attorney for the
judgment creditor as officer of the court. It may be served upon any person, except the
employer of a judgment debtor. . .. It shall specify all of the parties to the action, .. the
amount of the judgment and the amount then due thereon ....
CPLR 5222(a) (1978).
The restraining notice serves the function of an injunction, "prohibiting the transfer of
the judgment debtor's property." Aspen Indus., Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 52 N.Y.2d
575, 579, 421 N.E.2d 808, 810, 439 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318 (1981); Medi-Physics v. Community
Hosp., 105 Misc. 2d 574, 575, 432 N.Y.S.2d 594, 596 (Rockland County Ct. 1980); CPLR
5222, commentary at 187 (1978). The restraining notice may be served on the debtor himself
or a third party garnishee in possession of property belonging to the judgment debtor and to
whom the garnishee is indebted. Aspen, 52 N.Y.2d at 579, 421 N.E.2d at 810, 439 N.Y.S.2d
at 318; see CPLR 5222, commentary at 185 (1978); see also Ivor B. Clark Co. v. Hogan, 296
F. Supp. 407, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (person served with notice cannot transfer property in
which judgment debtor has an interest).
Inasmuch as the restraining order does not create a lien preventing third-party intervention, the judgment creditor must proceed to execution and levy. Aspen, 52 N.Y.2d at
579-80, 421 N.E.2d at 811, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 319. A valid judgment is a necessary predicate
for the issuance of an order of execution. See Gravino v. Gravino, 3 App. Div. 2d 641, 641,
158 N.Y.S.2d 130, 130 (4th Dep't 1956). In addition, the sheriff is required to exercise "reasonable diligence" in carrying out the order of execution, see Williamson Mill & Lumber Co.
v. Valentine, 206 App. Div. 252, 257, 200 N.Y.S. 527, 530 (4th Dep't 1923), and can be
compelled under the order to compute and collect accrued interest against a delinquent
debtor, see Beneficial Discount Co. v. Spike, 91 Misc. 2d 733, 734, 398 N.Y.S.2d 651, 653
(Sup. Ct. Yates County 1977).
CPLR 5230(a) provides that "an execution shall direct that only the property in which
a named judgment debtor who is not deceased has an interest, or the debts owed him, be
levied upon." CPLR 5230(a) (1978). CPLR 5230(b) further provides that "[a]t any time
before a judgment is satisfied ... an execution may be issued ... by the clerk of the court
or the attorney for the judgment creditor as officer of the court." Id. 5230(b).
CPLR 5232(a) states in relevant part that "[t]he sheriff shall levy upon any interest of
the judgment debtor in personal property not capable of delivery. . . by serving a copy of
the execution upon the garnishee." Id. 5232(a). CPLR 5232(b) stipulates that "[t]he sheriff
shall levy upon any interest of the judgment debtor in personal property capable of delivery
by taking the property into his custody." Id. 5232(b). The sheriff may act either under subdivision (a) or (b) depending on the nature of the property. See id. 5223(a), (b). Proceeding
under the wrong subdivision may prejudice the rights of the judgment creditor and expose
the sheriff to liability. See id. 5232, commentary at 387.
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court declared these sections of the CPLR unconstitutional, holding that they violated procedural due process of law by failing to
require notice to judgment debtors prior to the application of their
property in satisfaction of a judgment. 7 In response, the New York
Legislature amended CPLR 5222 and 5232. 4' Recently, in Warren
v. Delaney,49 the Appellate Division, Second Department, reaf'" Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Deary, the
court confronted the issue of whether the New York procedures for restraint, execution, and
levy in the post-judgment context were unconstitutional to the extent that they did not
provide the judgment debtor with notice and did not afford him reasonable opportunity to
contest the enforcement process. Id. at 1183. The court rejected the argument that notice
given by the garnishee bank to the judgment debtor was sufficient to satisfy minimum due
process requirements, holding that such notice does not apprise the judgment debtor of the
statutory mechanisms for asserting exemptions. Id. at 1187-88. Similarly, the court reasoned
that the post-seizure remedial provisions, CPLR 5239 and 5240, were of little value if the
debtor was not aware of them. Id. at 1188. Thus, the court concluded that evolving conceptions of due process made it essential that notice be given to the judgment debtor before
initiating the enforcement process. See id. at 1188.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is directed at "state action" that
interferes with the exercise of protected rights of individuals. Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974); Montalvo v. Consolidated Edison Co., 110 Misc. 2d 24,
28, 441 N.Y.S.2d 768, 773 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 13 (1948)), rev'd, 92 App. Div. 2d 389, 460 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1st Dep't 1983), aff'd, 61
N.Y.2d 810, 742 N.E.2d 149, 473 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1984). The classic conception of due process
was articulated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), wherein
the Court said that due process requires the opportunity to be heard, which is vitiated if
notice to avail oneself of that opportunity is not given. Id.
A due process analysis involves two considerations: first, whether a recognizable right or
interest has been infringed upon, and, if so, what process is due to the aggrieved party under
the circumstances. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982); see also
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982) (threshold due process inquiry is
whether there exists a right or privilege); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71
(1972) (initial step is to examine the nature of the asserted protected interest).
48 See ch. 882, §§ 1-2, [1982] N.Y. Laws 2241 (McKinney). The amendments to CPLR
5222 and 5232 became effective September 1, 1982. Id. The most prominent feature of the
amendments is the requirement that a statutorily prescribed notice, informing the judgment
debtor of the exemptions and the procedure for asserting them, precede or accompany the
restraining notice. CPLR 5222, commentary at 32 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); id. 5232,
commentary at 57 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); see CPLR 5222(d), 5232(c) (McKinney
Supp. 1983-1984). The notice must enumerate the types of property immune from seizure,
although the list need not be all-inclusive. See CPLR 5222(e) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984);
see also CPLR 5205, 5206 ( 1978 & Supp. 1983-84) (listing of exempt real and personal
property). The constitutionality of the statute in its amended form has been questioned as
well. See CPLR 5222, supplementary commentaries at 32 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); see
also Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 550 F. Supp. 642, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court declined to
comment on success of New York Legislature in alleviating constitutional infirmities of statute). In Deary, the court was unwilling to adjudicate the constitutionality of the amended
statute solely on its face; instead, the court preferred to wait to see how the rules operated
in practice. 550 F. Supp. at 643.
9 98 App. Div. 2d 799, 469 N.Y.S.2d 975 (2d Dep't 1983).
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firmed the unconstitutionality of the pre-amendment sections of
the CPLR and held that a cause of action for wrongful deprivation
of due process will lie against individuals who acted under the direction of the stricken provisions."
In Warren, the plaintiffs, judgment debtors, commenced an
action against all the participants in the collection process including the sheriff, who had levied upon their funds on deposit in the
garnishee bank.5 The defendants had acted in strict compliance
5
with the pre-amendment provisions of Article 52 of the CPLR. 1
The plaintiffs sought monetary, as well as, declaratory and injunctive relief. 53 Special term, on motions for summary judgment from
both sides, rejected the constitutional attack on the former sections and dismissed the complaint against all defendants. 4 On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the dismissal.5
After holding the pre-amendment CPLR sections constitutionally deficient,56 the Appellate Division examined the diverse interId. at 801, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
I" See id. at 799, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 976. In a consolidated action, plaintiffs Warren and
50

Tolley brought suit against the judgment creditors, the attorneys for the judgment creditors,
the garnishee bank, and the sheriff, in both his individual and official capacities. See id. at
799, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 975-76.
52 See id. at 799-800, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 975-77. In accordance with CPLR 5222 and 5230,
the attorneys for the defendant judgment creditors issued and served the restraining notice
upon the defendant garnishee bank. See id. at 799, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 976. Pursuant to these
sections, the attorneys issued orders of execution and delivered them to the defendant sheriff for levy. See id.
63 Id. at 800, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 976. The plaintiffs alleged that the enforcement procedures contravened the due process clause of article I, § 6 of the New York State Constitution by failing to give notification to a judgment debtor of the imminent appropriation of his
property and adequate opportunity for contesting the seizure. Id. at 799-800, 469 N.Y.S.2d
at 976.
" Id. at 800, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 976. Special term reached its decision on the authority of
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285 (1924). 98 App. Div. 2d at
800, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 976. In Endicott Johnson, the Court addressed the adequacy of notice
in the post-judgment context. See 266 U.S. at 286-88.
51 98 App. Div. 2d at 801, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
86 Id. at 800, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 977. The court cited Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co.,
33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973), in which the Court of Appeals
addressed the constitutionality of a lien law that allowed an innkeeper summarily to seize
the property of a non-paying guest without notice. 98 App. Div. 2d at 800, 469 N.Y.S.2d at
977 (citing Blye, 33 N.Y.2d at 18, 300 N.E.2d at 713, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 173). The Blye Court
held that the applicable sections of the innkeeper's lien law were unconstitutional. 33
N.Y.2d at 18-19, 300 N.E.2d at 713, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 173-74.
In addition, the Warren court cited with approval Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 550 F.
Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), and a line of United States Supreme Court cases invalidating
various state pre-judgment garnishment statutes. See Warren, 98 App. Div. 2d at 800-01,
469 N.Y.S.2d at 977. In Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), the Supreme
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ests to be accommodated.57 While noting that the judgment crediCourt struck down a pre-judgment enforcement statute, observing that even a temporary
deprivation of wages may work a substantial hardship upon an individual. See id. at 340.
Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, stated that neither the fact that the notice of the
garnishment accompanied the seizure nor the fact that a permanent dispossession would not
occur until after an adverse decision on the merits justified dispensing with a notice requirement. Id. at 343 (Harlan, J., concurring).
In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Court considered the validity of a replevin
statute that permitted anyone claiming an interest in property to seize the property by
making an ex parte application and posting a security bond without notification at any time.
Id. at 69-70. The property seized had been the subject of a consumer sales contract that
provided that title was retained by the seller until final payment on the installment contract
was made. Id. at 70. The Court concluded that despite the temporary and non-essential
nature of the seizure, and the absence of a perfected interest, the judgment debtor was
entitled to due process safeguards. See id. at 89-90.
It is submitted that the expansive holding in Fuentes apparently has been undercut by
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), in which the Court held, on facts nearly
identical to Fuentes, that pre-attachment notice was not constitutionally mandated. Id. at
601-03. The Mitchell Court determined that Sniadach was not precedent since wages, a
special type of property, were the object of the garnishment. Id. at 614.
Mitchell rejected the analysis presented in Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia
Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285 (1924), in which the Court held that due process does not require
notification to the judgment debtor of the enforcement process, reasoning that the underlying action that culminated in a judgment being rendered against the debtor was sufficient to
alert him to the commencement of the enforcement process. Id. at 288-89. This rationale
has come under increasing criticism, with courts distinguishing Endicott Johnson on the
basis of a default judgment, see Cole v. Goldberger, Pedersen & Hochron, 95 Misc. 2d 720,
726-27, 410 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1978), a cognovit agreement, see
Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272, 1277 (N.D. Il1. 1972), and the presence of exempt
funds, see Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 56-57 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
57 See Warren, 98 App. Div. 2d at 800-01, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 977-78. The court in Warren
employed a balancing test that has become a hallmark of due process jurisprudence. See
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 570-71 (1972) (court must look not to weight but to nature of interest at stake);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (private interest in unrestricted receipt of public
assistance weighed against state concern for increasing financial burden). The balancing
process embodies three elements: the private interest at stake, the probability of the loss of
that interest, and the governmental stake in the outcome. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335;
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961). In Warren, the judgment creditor's interest in ensuring satisfaction of his judgment was subordinated to the judgment debtor's interest in the unfettered use and unencumbered title to statutorily exempt funds. See 98 App. Div. 2d at 801, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 97778. Moreover, the state interest in the prompt and efficient enforcement of judgments was
subordinated to the correlative interest in the protection of the judgment debtors. See id. at
801, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
Courts generally observe that the form of the opportunity to be heard always depends
upon the particular facts and circumstances. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155
(1974); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481; Montalvo v. Consolidated Edison Co., 110 Misc 2d 24,
36-37, 441 N.Y.S.2d 768, 776-78 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1981), rev'd, 92 App. Div. 2d
389, 460 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1st Dep't 1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 810, 463 N.E.2d 149, 473 N.Y.S.2d
972 (1984).
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tor's interest in the swift and inexpensive satisfaction of his award
is of considerable import, the court determined that the countervailing interest of the judgment debtor in protecting exempt property is paramount.5" It is submitted that the court, in deciding that
a cause of action existed in Warren, has placed an impermissible
burden on the public official by effectively compelling the official
to ascertain the constitutionality of his activities in advance. Moreover, it is suggested that the court, in failing to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim against the defendant sheriff, has undermined the ability of public officials to execute statutorily defined responsibilities
in an efficient and expeditious manner.
Although the principle of state sovereign immunity has largely
been abolished by judicial decision or legislative enactment,5 9 vestiges of governmental immunity remain under the problematical
rubric of "discretionary" activities.6 0 Thus, while it is well settled
that officials do enjoy immunity in the performance of acts that are
classified as discretionary, they do not enjoy immunity in the performance of ministerial or non-discretionary acts."'
58See Warren, 98 App. Div. 2d at 801, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 977-78. The court affirmed
summary judgment for the attorneys for the judgment creditors, but remanded the case,
"[w]ithout expressing any opinion as to plaintiffs' individual claims against the. . . defendants," for a trial on the issue of damages. Id. at 801, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
59 See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TEXT 468-73 (3d ed. 1972); W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 1043-51 (5th ed. 1984). See generally, Fox, The King Must Do
No Wrong: A Critique of the Current Status of Sovereign and Official Immunity, 25 WAYNE
L. REV. 177, 182 (1979) (abolition of the principle of state sovereign immunity by judicial
decision or legislative enactment); Schoenbrun, Sovereign Immunity, 44 TEx. L. REV. 151,
177 (1965) (Texas legislatures have been granting permission to sue "automatically").
New York abrogated its sovereign immunity with the passage of the Court of Claims
Act. See N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 (McKinney 1968). The state waiver of sovereign immunity
was held to devolve upon all geo-political subdivisions of the state. Bernadine v. City of
New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 365, 62 N.E.2d 604, 605 (1945); accord Holmes v. County of Erie,
266 App. Div. 220, 222, 42 N.Y.S.2d 243, 245 (4th Dep't 1943) (waiver of immunity by state
stripped counties of their shield against liability). Furthermore, the waiver of immunity rendered the agents of the state subject to liability for their misconduct. Bloom v. Jewish Bd. of
Guardians, 286 N.Y. 349, 352, 36 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1941); Foyster v. Tutuska, 44 Misc. 2d
303, 306, 253 N.Y.S.2d 634, 638 (Erie County Ct. 1964), modified on other grounds, 25 App.
Div. 2d 940, 270 N.Y.S.2d 535 (4th Dep't 1966).
60 See K. DAvis, supra note 59 at 485-87; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 59, at
1046-51.
" See Rottkamp v. Young, 21 App. Div. 2d 373, 375, 249 N.Y.S.2d 330, 333-34 (2d
Dep't 1964) (liability for ministerial or non-discretionary act but not for judicial or discretionary acts); Drake v. City of Rochester, 96 Misc. 2d 86, 98, 408 N.Y.S.2d 847, 857 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1978) (state and its civil division immune for "quasi-judicial" or "discretionary acts").
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Under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,62 public
officials have a qualified immunity to protect them from the consequences of their official duties when it is found that they acted in
good faith ignorance of the unconstitutionality of the law.13 It is
submitted that section 1983 and the abundant case law it has
spawned provide an appropriate analytical model from which to
fashion equitable protection for public officials charged with constitutional violations. Until recently, the federal courts used a two
part objective/subjective test to determine whether immunity
should be applied. 4 Under this standard, a court first considers
whether the public official knew that he was violating the Constitution. 5 Second, the court inquires whether there was a malicious
6' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State. . . subjects. . . any citizen of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .
Id.
63 See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1978) (qualified immunity for
prison officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576-77 (1975) (qualified immunity for
superintendent of state hospital); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 313-22 (1975) (qualified
immunity for local school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-49 (1974)
(qualified good faith immunity for state governor and other executive officers).
", See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
"' See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). The Court in Wood framed the
objective prong of the test in the form of "basic, unquestioned constitutional rights." Id.
That is, the public official must show that the existence of the violated right was not
"clearly established." See Baker v. City of Detroit, 458 F. Supp. 379, 383 (E.D. Mich. 1978),
aff'd, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984). The Supreme Court
has employed this test in a number of cases. In Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978),
prison officials were charged with violating the rights of inmates by censoring or failing to
deliver the inmates' correspondence. Id. at 557 & n.3. The officials contended that when the
alleged violations occurred, a right of "protected mailing" had not been recognized and that
the right had not been clearly established until several years later. Id. at 562-63. The Court
held as a matter of law that the prison officials could not be charged with knowledge of a
pre-natal constitutional right. Id. at 565.
In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Court stated that the officer claiming the immunity is under "no duty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments." Id. at 577; see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (police officer cannot be
"charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law"); Peltack v. Borough of
Manville, 547 F. Supp. 770, 776 (D.N.J. 1982) (officials could not know that conduct that
previously was never adjudicated as unconstitutional was improper); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F.
Supp. 1342, 1382 (D. Mass. 1979) ("defendants are not charged with a duty to anticipate
then unchartered constitutional developments").
A public official may safely rely upon a systematic and unbroken practice, long pursued
and never before questioned. See, e.g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1328-29 (8th Cir.)
(defendant was entitled to rely upon police manual in conflict with post-incident interpretation of state law), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978); Adeldau v. New York City, 431 F. Supp.
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intent to cause a deprivation of protected rights." It is suggested
that where, as in the instant case, a voided statute was previously
free from constitutional attack, and its validity was not otherwise
cast in doubt by developing case law, the public official should be
granted a "presumption of propriety."
Since qualified immunity is an affirmative defense under existing law, a presumption of propriety would shift the burden of
proof to the plaintiff asserting that the acts of the official were unconstitutional.6 7 This shift will not create insuperable obstacles to
recovery, however, since, under the threshold objective test, the
burden of the plaintiff to prove that the defendant knew he was
violating the Constitution is no greater than the burden the defendant public official must sustain in attempting to disprove his own
"knowledge."6 8 Furthermore, it is suggested that by shifting the
burden of proof to the plaintiff, an equitable balance is reached
between the need to compensate victims of constitutional torts, 9
and the policy underlying official immunity, which is to enable
public officials to perform their important public functions undeterred by fear of exposure to civil liability.7 0 The ruling in War812, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (immunity granted if defendant relied in good faith on existing
procedures).
" The subjective prong of the test requires the court to determine whether there exists
a malicious or deliberate intent to cause a deprivation of a constitutional right. See Reese v.
Nelson, 598 F.2d 822, 825-26 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 970 (1979).
Recently, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Supreme Court, in the interest of judicial economy, reduced the qualified immunity test to a single, objective inquiry.
Id. at 818-19. The Court stated that the test is whether the law was clearly established at
the time the act occurred. Id. at 818. However, it is suggested that the subjective part of the
test should not be completely discarded, as it is relevant to the issue of punitive damages.
See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1381 (D. Mass. 1979).
61 Under existing law, qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, casting the burden
of proof on the public official. See Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1213 (5th Cir. 1976) (en
banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976); Farmer v. Lawson, 510 F. Supp. 91, 96 (N.D. Ga.
1981); Wren v. Jones, 457 F. Supp. 234, 245 (S.D. Ill. 1978).
" See Teddy's Drive In, Inc. v. Cohen, 47 N.Y.2d 79, 82, 390 N.E.2d 290, 291, 416
N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (1979). The inherent unfairness of imposing liability because of the ofttime quixotic nature of constitutional law, it is submitted, militates in favor of the adoption
of a rule that requires the plaintiff to establish the defendant's knowledge. As aptly stated
by Justice Powell: "[o]ne need only look to the decisions of this Court-to our reversals, our
recognition of evolving concepts, and our five-to-four splits-to recognize the hazard of even
informed prophecy as to what are 'unquestioned constitutional rights.'" Woods v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 329 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
"0 See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-42 (1974); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564, 573-74 (1959); Laverne v. Corning, 522 F.2d 1144, 1149 (2d Cir. 1975).
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ren, which involved a statute that had never been constitutionally
questioned, provides a compelling illustration of the need for a rule
to protect a dutiful public Official from the vagaries of constitutional law.
Vincent J. Coyle, Jr.
GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW

GML § 50-e: Statute of limitations is tolled under CPLR 204
when plaintiff's application to serve late notice of claim is sub
judice
Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law (GML) requires
that, as a condition precedent to suit against a public corporation,
a plaintiff must serve a notice of claim upon the defendant public
corporation within ninety days after the claim arises.7 1 The statute
7

GML § 50-e(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). GML § 50-e provides, in pertinent

part:
(a) In any case founded upon tort where a notice of claim is required by law as a
condition precedent to the commencement of an action... against a public corporation, as defined in the general construction law ... the notice of claim shall...
be served ... within ninety days after the claim arises ....
Id. A public corporation includes, among others, "a county, city, town, village and school
district." N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 66(1)-(2) (McKinney -Supp. 1983-1984). Section 50-e
applies only to plaintiffs who are required by law to serve the notice of claim as a condition
precedent to the commencement of the action. GML § 50-e(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 19831984). The statute was intended and designed to encompass not only statutorily required
notices of claim, but also judicially prescribed notices. See Graziano, Recommendations Relating to Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law and Related Statutes, TWENTY-FIRST
ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE, 358, 374 (1976). The service of the notice of claim is
merely a condition precedent to suit, "not a statutory prohibition." Weiss v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 68 Misc. 2d 1059, 1061, 328 N.Y.S.2d 767, 769 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1972). As a condition precedent-that is, an act or event other than a lapse of time, that
must exist or occur before the duty to perform a promise arises, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 224 & comment b (1981)-performance or excuse is "an essential element of
[the plaintiff's] cause of action" and must be pleaded and proved in the same manner as all
other elements of his cause of action, see Graziano, supra at 373-74. The notice of claim
must provide the nature of the claim, the time, place and manner in which the claim arose,
and for some plaintiffs, the damages, thus far ascertainable, claimed to have been suffered.
GML § 50-e(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). The notice must be served "within ninety
days after the claim arises," id. § 50-e(1)(a), and must be in writing, sworn to by the claimant, and include the name and address of the claimant and his attorney, see id. § 50-e(2).
The primary purpose of the requirement that a municipality be served with a notice of
claim is to provide public corporations with "an opportunity to investigate claims and obtain evidence promptly." SIEGEL § 32, at 32; Beary v. City of Rye, 44 N.Y.2d 398, 412-13, 377
N.E.2d 453, 458, 406 N.Y.S.2d 9, 13-14 (1978); see Winbush v. City of Mount Vernon, 306
N.Y. 327, 333, 118 N.E.2d 459, 462 (1954); Ziecker v. Town of Orchard Park, 70 App. Div. 2d
422, 427, 421 N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (4th Dep't 1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 957, 416 N.E.2d 1055, 435

